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Abstract
It is well known that Member States of the European Community (“EC”) do not always com-
ply with Treaty provisions or with directly applicable secondary Community legislation. There
are, however, legal remedies in the case of noncompliance of Treaty provisions or directly binding
regulations. Citizens may bring claims against Member States in national courts or may lodge
a complaint with the Commission. The situation is more complicated with claims based on di-
rectives because directives must be implemented by Member State legislation. Member States
are responsible for adapting their existing legislation or establishing new legislation. Often, this
is done late, long after expiration of the period for Member State compliance, or else, in many
cases, the transposition does not fully comply with the text or the spirit of the directive. A number
of remedies are available in the event of noncompliance. European Court of Justice (“ECJ” or
“Court”) case law has extended the principles of direct applicability to directive provisions that
are clear and unconditional. In the Francovich case, the Court went beyond this and found that
citizens can have an action for damages if they suffer a financial loss when a Member State fails
to implement a directive in due time. Finally, one of the innovations of the Maastricht Treaty on
European Union (“TEU”) is the possibility of ordering a Member State that fails to comply with
an ECJ judgment to pay a lump sum or penalty. This new provision must be seen in the context of
the Treaty provisions for infringement proceedings against Member States. Before turning to this
provision, I would like to refer to some other ideas on how to improve the quality of Community
legislation in order to improve Member State compliance.
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INTRODUCTION
The European Community ("EC") is a Community based on
the rule of law. In the words of Walter Hallstein, the first Presi-
dent of the EEC Commission, it is a "Communaut6 de droit," a
"Rechtsgemeinschaft."1 This statement incorporates quite a
number of elements. The most important element is that the
Community acts under a Treaty or, indeed, a set of Treaties that
form its constitution.2
This constitution is characterized by institutions which de-
velop and administer the establishment of "an ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe."3 For this purpose, the Commu-'
nity institutions are granted legislative, administrative, and judi-
cial powers. Member States are bound by this Community ac-
tion, the characteristics of which have been established, over the'
years, by the 'European Court of Justice ("ECJ" or "Court").
Among the characteristics established, the principles of direct
applicability and of supremacy of Community law over national
legislation are most important.
It is well known that Member States do not always comply
with Treaty provisions or with directly applicable secondary
Community legislation. There are, however, legal remedies in
* Rechtsanwalt, Former Director in the EC Commission Legal Service. This Essay
was adapted from a paper presented at the Second Congress of the European Associa-
tion of Legislation, Rome, March 24 - 25, 1995.
1. WALTER HALLSTEIN, DIE EUROPAISCHE GEMEINSCHAFT 51-77 (1979).
2. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter
TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-41)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
3. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, pmbl., 298 U.N.T.S. at 14, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 at
1.
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the case of noncompliance of Treaty provisions or directly bind-
ing regulations. Citizens may bring claims against Member
States in national courts or may lodge a complaint with the Com-
mission. The situation is more complicated with claims based on
directives because directives must be implemented by Memeber
State legislation. Member States are responsible for adapting
their existing legislation or establishing new legislation. Often,
this is done late, long after expiration of the period for Member
State compliance, or else, in many cases, the transposition does
not fully comply with the text or the spirit of the directive.
A number of remedies are available in the event of noncom-
pliance. ECJ case law has extended the principles of direct appli-
cability to directive provisions that are clear and unconditional.
In the Francovich4 case, the Court went beyond this and found
that citizens can have an action for damages if they suffer a fi-
nancial loss when a Member State fails to implement a directive
in due time. Finally, one of the innovations of the Maastricht
Treaty on European Union5 ("TEU") is the possibility of order-
ing a Member State that fails to comply with an ECJjudgment to
pay a lump sum or penalty.6 This new provision must be seen in
the context of the Treaty provisions for infringement proceed-
ings against Member States. Before turning to this provision, I
would like to refer to some other ideas on how to improve the
quality of Community legislation in order to improve Member
State compliance.
I. MEASURES IN ORDER TO HELP IMPROVE THE QUALITY
OF EC LEGISLATION
Delayed implementation of a directive or implementation
that does not always comply with the content or spirit of the di-
rective can at times be blamed on Community institutions. If
Community texts were simpler and clearer,' Member States
would have less difficulties implementing them or would be
likely to make fewer errors of interpretation of Community texts.
It is understandable that the ECJ requires, as it has on a number
4. Francovitch v. Italy,Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5357, [1991]
2 C.M.L.R. 66 [hereinafter Francovitch].
5. TEU, supra note 2, Oj. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (amending EEC
Treaty).
6. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 171(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 687.
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of occasions, "clear and unequivocal texts." It is less obvious that
this is a subject for a European summit. This is nevertheless
what took place at the Edinburgh European Council in Decem-
ber 1992. 7 The conclusions of the EC Presidency refer to the
necessary practical steps to improve the quality of Community
legislation and even suggests a number of potential steps.' This
idea has been further developed by the EC Council. On June 8,
1993, the Council adopted a resolution on the drafting quality of
Community legislation. This Resolution suggests a list of ten
points that should be kept in mind. "Clarity" and "simplicity"
are the master words, most frequently appearing. Such an initia-
tive was certainly important. What is even more important is
that the adoption of such a resolution shows that Member States
and Community institutions are aware of the problem and are
looking for remedies.
The initiatives taken so far are insufficient. It is not enough
that a single institution adopts more precise rules on how to leg-
islate, if the others do not follow in the adoption of similiar legis-
lation. For instance, the Commission is bound to prepare the
Legislation drafts, but drafts are also handled by the EC Parlia-
ment and EC Council. What is really necessary and might help
further improve things is an inter-institutional arrangement, a
kind of code of conduct concerning the drafting of legislation,
particularly the drafting of directives. The Commission as well as
the Parliament and Council, the other two legislative bodies,
would adhere to this code. The Commission, however, has fa-
vored other measures and remedies to encourage more effective
legislation.
For the future, the Commission is committed to promulgat-
ing less legislation, but legislation that is better written. With the
achievement of the internal market in 1993, the proliferation of
community legislation has already dropped sharply. What re-
mains is to improve the quality of future legislation. I believe
that in order to achieve this goal, the initiatives taken by the Eu-
ropean Association of Legislation 9 can play a useful role.
7. Conclusions of the EC Presidency from the Edinburgh European Council, De-
cember 1992, 12 E.C. BULL., no. 1, at 28-29 (1992).
8. Council Resolution of 8June 1993, oJ. C 166/1 (1993) (concerning quality of
drafting of Community Legislation).
9. The European Association of Legislation was founded in Bad Homburg, Ger-
many in 1991.
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II. PENALTIES TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH
COMMUNITY LAW
EC Treaty Article 169 empowers the Commission to bring a
Member State before the ECJ if it breaches its obligations under
the Treaties and fails to take the necessary remedial action after
a reasoned opinion of the Commision has been addressed to it."0
Article 170 offers the Member States comparable methods to
"prosecute" each other, but only after a complaint has been
lodged with the Commission, who, in turn, has found that no
action is warranted." Commission infringement proceedings
under Article 169 are a regular occurrence. Article 170 actions
are, for all intents and purposes, a purely theoretical possibility
and will not be considered in this paper.
What Articles 169 and 170 actually provide is a full-dress
court procedure culminating in a judgment. If the ECJ finds
that the Member State in question has failed to fulfill its Treaty
obligations, the Member State is required by Article 171 to "take
the necessary measures to comply with the judgment." 2 The
Court's judgment, therefore, is essentially declaratory, neither
depriving national law of its effect nor creating new law. It is for
the Member State to consider what action it must take to comply
with Community law, and that may entail changing its law,
whether by amendment or new enactment. The same applies in
a pending action when the ECJ orders interim measures at the
application of one of the parties, except that here the Court's
10. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 169, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686. "If the State con-
cerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the Commis-
ion, the latter may bring the matter before the Court ofJustice." Id.
11. Id. art. 170, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686.
A Member State which considers that another Member State has failed to
fulfil an obligation under this Treaty may bring the matter before the Court of
Justice.
If the Commission has not delivered an opinion within three months of
the date on which the matter was brought before it, the absence of such opin-
ion shall not prevent the matter from being brought before the Court of Jus-
tice.
Id.
12. Id. art. 171, (1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 687. "If the Court of Justice finds that a
Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under this Treaty, the State shall be
required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgement of the Court of
Justice." Id.
19961
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order will generally specify exactly what remedial measures are
to be taken by the Member State.
Originally, there were no provisions imposing penalties on
Member States that did not meet their obligations under ECJ
final judgments or interim orders. For a long time it was even
assumed that there would be no need for penalties. A whole
generation of Community law scholars was assured that the au-
thority of the Court's judgments was such that no Member State
would dare defy a judgment made against it in an infringement
proceeding. As Thomas Oppermann recently wrote, "the effec-
tiveness of the Community legal order rests on the loyalty to the
Treaties shown by Members, who will have to take the requisite
implementing measures in their own interests and their com-
mon interest in having the Community operate efficiently and
smoothly."1 3 In the early days of the Treaties, Ernst Wohlfarth
stated, "[t]he point is that there is a general assumption that
Member States will comply with the Court's judgments."' 4 A de-
claratory judgment by the ECJ, therefore, was presumed to be
sufficient grounds for the offending Member State to put an im-
mediate end to its infringement of the Treaty, and this was
borne out in practice in the early years. But as the Commission
began to routinely bring actions against Member States allegedly
infringing the Treaty, the number ofjudgments not immediately
complied with similairly began to rise. The Court's authority
seemed to be coming under threat.
In the 1980's, the Commission adopted the practice, when
no effect was given to the first judgment, of commencing a sec-
ond infringement proceeding with respect to that omission, but
this produced no tangible improvement in the discipline shown
by Member States. The Commission's Eleventh Annual Report
to Parliament on its monitoring of the application of Commu-
nity law 5 states that on its cut-off date of December 31, 1993,
there were eighty-two outstanding cases where Member States
had not complied with Article 169judgments given against them
in Article 169 infringement proceedings, and nine cases in
13. Thomas Oppermann, Die dritte Gewalt in der Europdischen Union, 1 DEUTSCiES
VERWALTUNGSBiATr 901, 902 (1994).
14. ERNST WOHLFARTH ET AL., DIE EUROPAISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFr, KoM-
MENTAR 485-86 (1960).
15. Commission's Eleventh Annual Report to Parliament on the Application of
Community Law, OJ. C 154/1 (1994).
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which a second judgment, given under Article 171, had been dis-
regarded as well.
The situation was not dramatic, but the time nevertheless
had come to fill in this gap in the Treaty's enforcement rules. In
the period prior to the ratification of the TEU, different quarters
called for Treaty amendments. 16 As a result, Article 171(2) was
added to the EC Treaty by the TEU. 17 This provision provides
for penalties where a Member State fails to comply with a second
judgment given against it:
(2). If the Commission considers that the Member State con-
cerned has not taken such measures it shall, after giving that
State the opportunity to submit its observations, issue a rea-
soned opinion specifying the points on which the Member
State has not complied with the judgment of the Court of
Justice.
If the Member State concerned fails to take the necessary
measures to comply with the Court's judgment within the
time-limit laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring
the case before the Court ofJustice. In so doing it shall spec-
ify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to be
paid by the Member State concerned which it considers ap-
propriate in the circumstances.
If the Court of Justice finds that the Member State con-
cerned has not complied with its judgment it may impose a
lump sum or penalty payment on it.
This procedure shall be without prejudice to Article
170.18
An identical provision was written into the Treaty Establish-
ing the Eurpoean Atomic Energy Community1 9 ("Euratom
16. Penalties for infringements of Community law were the subject of the XVth
Congress of the Federation Internationale pour le Droit European (Lisbon, 1992). See
C.W.A. Timmermans, Community Report, in 2 FIDE REPORTS POUR LE XV CONGRES; LA
SANCTION DES INFRACTIONS AU DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE 17 (1992). Giuseppe Tesauro,
General Report, in 2 FIDE REPORTS POUR LE XV CONGRES; LA SANCTION DES INFRACTIONS
AU DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE 425 (1992). The country reports consider special features of
national law. See also Similiter Tesauro, Verfahren zur Einhaltung des Gemeinschaflsrechts
durch die Mitgliedstaaten, in SANKTIONEN ALS MITTEL ZUR DURCHSETZUNG DES GEMEIN-
SCHAFrSREC-rrS, Annual Congress of the European Law Academy, Trier, Germany 1994
(forthcoming) [hereinafter Similiter Tesauro].
17. See Diez-Hochleitner, Le traiti de Maastricht et l'inexicution des arrits de la Cour de
Justice par les Etats membres, REVUE DU MARCHt UNIQUE EUROPIEN 111 (1994).
18. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 171(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 687.
19. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community Community,
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Treaty") .2° The European Coal and Steel Community Treaty1
("ECSC Treaty"), for no apparent reason, was left unchanged. 22
The ECSC Treaty does contain Article 88 which can be seen as
the forerunner of Article 171(2), though it provides for a some-
what different response to infringements by Member States. 23
Article 88, however, seems never to have been applied,24 sug-
gesting that we should consider whether the solution adopted
for the EC and Euratom Treaty is likely to achieve the desired
effect.
III. MEASURES TO COMPLY WITH ECJJUDGEMENTS
An initial problem with the new clause in Article 171(2) is
that it does not define what is meant by "measures." This ambi-
guity was already present in the pre-TEU Article 171.25 When
this early Article was drafted, the Commission did not need to
state clearly what was to be done to comply with judgements.
There was no possibility of a proceeding for the failure to com-
ply with Article 171 itself and in practice nothing was done. In
Article 171(2) proceedings, however, the Commission will have
to specify what measures must be taken, for this is how the Com-
mission will establish the gravity of the infringement and thus
justify the lump sum or penalty payment that it considers the
ECJ should impose.
There is no particular difficulty where the Member State has
simply neglected to issue the necessary implementing measures
Mar. 25, 1957, art. 143, 298 U.N.T.S 167, 219 [hereinafter Euratom Treaty], as amended
in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
20. Id. art. 143, 298 U.N.T.S. at 219.
21. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
261 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty], as amended in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
22. See id. (Showing no similiar amendment)
23. Id. art. 88, 261 U.N.T.S. at 221. Article 88 provides that:
If the State has not fulfilled its obligation by the time limit set by the High
Authority, or if it brings an action which is dismissed, the High Authority may,
with the assent of the Council acting by a two-thirds majority:
(a) suspend the payment of any sums which it may be liable to pay to the
State in question under this Treaty;
(b) take measures, by way of derogation from the provisions of Article 4,
in order to correct the effects of the infringment of the obligation.
Id.
24. See Timmermanns, supra note 16, at 17.
25. EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 171, 298 U.N.T.S. at 75, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1
at 57.
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such as transposing a directive. The measures that must be
taken in a case such as this will be to transpose the directive.
Matters will be somewhat more complicated where the Member
State enjoys some discretion in rectifying its infringement. In a
case of tax discrimination contrary to Article 95 of the EC
Treaty, for example, there is the choice between lowering the
tax burden on imported goods and raising the tax on home-pro-
duced goods. The ECJ cannot interfere with the Member State's
exercise of its discretion in such a circumstance, and a purely
declaratory judgment will suffice. In Article 171 (2) proceedings
the Commission will not be able to escape considering the alter-
natives.
The picture will look different when it comes to specifying
the amount of the penalty to be imposed for a Treaty infringe-
ment. This problem has entered many Community law books in
their discussions of the Francovich case.26 Furthermore, aca-
demic lawyers have always emphasized this aspect of the infringe-
ment proceeding. 27 Yet, the problem was present from the out-
set. In 1960, the ECJ, in Humblet,2 8 considered the obligations of
the Member States to both repeal legislation found contrary to
Community law and repair the effects of unlawful acts done on
the basis of this legislation. Incidentally, the Court cited Humblet
in the Francovitch case.2 9 In subsequent cases, the Court has fol-
lowed this principle, 0 holding that compensation in the form of
damages is required if it is not possible to restore the situation
that would have existed in the absence of the breach.3"
26. Francovitch, [1991] E.C.R. 1-5357, [1991] 2 C.M.L.R. 66.
27. See Pierre Pescatore, Responsabiliti des tats membres en cas de manquement aux
rigles communautaires, in 27 IL FoRo PADAa.O 10, 17-18 (1972); PIERRE PESCATORE,
L'ORDREJURIDIQUE DES COMMUNAUTiS EUROPtENNES 265 (1973); see generally PIERRE PES-
CATORE, THE LAW OF INTEGRATION (1974); Denys Simon & Ami Barav, La responsabiliti de
l'administration nationale en cas de violation du droit communautaire, REVUE DU MARCHE
COMMUN 165 (1987); see also Answer Given by the Commission to Written Question No
E-1808/93 by Rosaria Bindi, OJ. C 289/6 (1994).
28. Humblet v. Belgian State, Case 6/60, [1960] E.C.R. at 559.
29. Francovitch, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-5414, (1991] 2 C.M.L.R. at 114.
30. Commission v. Italy, Case 39/72, [1973] E.C.R. 101, 112 1 11, [1991] 2
C.M.L.R. 439, 455 11; Commission v Germany, Case 70/72, [1973] E.C.R. 813, 8291
13, [1973] C.M.L.R. 741, 764 1 13.
31. Russo v. Azienda di Stato per gli Interventi sul Mercato Agricolo (AIMA), Case
60/75, [1976] E.C.R. 45, 56 1 9, [1976 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH);
Commision v. Italy, Case 309/84, [1986] E.C.R. 599, 609, [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 657, 667;
Commission v Italy, Case 103/84, [1986] E.C.R. 1759, 1771 9, [1985-1986 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 14,334 at 17,090.
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Both the Commission and, of course, the ECJ face the sin-
gularly daunting prospect of determining what measures should
be taken to effect compliance with a judgment. The Commis-
sion's reasoned opinion must already state "the points on which
the Member State... has not complied with the judgment of the
Court of Justice.""2 This will include the conflicting legislative
provisions and also the value of the damage sustained. Despite
Francovich, there is still considerable uncertainty as to the condi-
tions for and the impact of liability. One hopes that the cases
now pending at the ECJss will provide the necessary clarification.
IV. A LUMP SUM OR A PENALTY PAYMENT?
Further difficulties with the application of Article 171(2)
will arise in determining "the amount of the lump sum or pen-
alty payment to be paid by the Member State concerned." 4 The
first question that arises will concern the objective pursued by
the judgment itself, which will determine whether a lump sum
payment or penalty payment is ordered. The question of the
amount comes next and is followed, in turn, by the questions of
the administration and distribution of powers between the Com-
mission and the ECJ.
The purpose of ajudgment rendered under Article 171(2),
imposition of fines, whether they are called lump-sum or penalty
payments, is to impose a "punishment" for conduct contrary to
the Treaties. An order to pay a lump sum has a primarily puni-
tive and deterrent purpose. The main aim of an order to make a
set monetary payment every month from the month following
the judgment is to induce the offending Member State to restore
conformity with the Treaties as rapidly as possible.
An order requiring penalty payments would detail the en-
actment of a directive or other measures necessary for compli-
ance. It is an open question as to whether compensation might
be required in this context. Mandatory compensation might
32. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 171(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R at 687.
33. See Brasserie du Pcheur SA v. Germany, Case C-46/93 (Eur. Ct. J.) (pend-
ing); Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame and others, Case C-
48/93 (Eur. Ct.J.) (pending). Admittedly these cases concern directly applicable Com-
munity law rather than directives. See ao Dillenkofer et al.,Joined Cases C-178/94, C-
179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 & C-190/94 (Eur. Ct. J.) (pending) (regarding damage
sustained as result of failure to transpose directive in good time).
34. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 171(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 687.
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constitute a "measure" for the purposes of Article 171 (1) and
the question might, therefore, be answered in the affirmative.
The distinction as to purpose between a lump-sum fine and a
monthly penalty payment is not so strict as to absolutely exclude
the possibility of the two being ordered in conjunction. The text
of the Article, however, is such that the possibility is difficult to
justify.
The Commission and the Court will usually opt for one
form of payment or the other. Penalty payments will in all likeli-
hood dominate, although 'there is no guidance on this point in
the Treaty. Penalty payments are more likely to attain the EC
objective of initial compliance because there is little deterrent
value in a lump sum fine. If the judgment orders a monthly pen-
alty payment, the measures required of the Member State as well
as the procedure for confirming the requisite conditions for the
penalty's termination must be absolutely clear.
Article 171(2) has no retroactive effect. It may not be con-
fined to cases where a Member State has failed to give effect to
an Article 169/170judgment rendered after entry into force of
the TEU. In view of the number of judgments already given
under the pre-TEU Article 171 and not yet implemented, it is
perfectly legitimate to ask whether there is jurisdiction to hear
and determine a new proceeding under the post-TEU Article for
the simple purpose of doing the job properly and imposing the
lump-sum or penalty payment. It can be argued that the crimi-
nal laws of all the Member States have the nulla poena sine lege35
principle and the lump-sums or penalty payments that the ECJ
has power to order are at the very least of an "administrative-
criminal," or Verwaltungsstrafrecht nature.3 6
The amount of penalty to be ordered is an extremely deli-
cate determination. A symbolic amount of ECU1000 or
ECU10,000 may suffice to bring a Member State into compli-
ance. It may, however, be necessary to look to a higher pain
threshold of ECU100,000 or even ECU1 million. The Treaty is
silent on the matter. The words "the amount which [the Com-
mission] considers appropriate" leave it to the Commission to
35. Literally translated: "No punishment without law."
36. Similiter Tesauro, supra note 16 (discussing use of penalties to enforce Com-
munity law).
1996]
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decide what it thinks is appropriate to propose and the ECJ to
decide what it considers a proper fine.
General principles of Community law would suggest that
the appropriateness of the penalty amount will be measured by
reference to two criteria: the gravity of the infringement and the
need for an adequate deterrent. The gravity criterion means
considering the aggregate impact on Community life. The con-
sideration includes: (1) whether fundamental freedoms are
threatened; (2) whether the Member State, or its citizens, de-
rived some special benefit from the infringement of which it or
they ought to be deprived; (3) whether other Member States sus-
tained injury to their economies; (4) whether private citizens
have been injured; (5) whether there is any prospect of compen-
sation; (6) whether the infringement is likely to be repeated; or
(7) whether the infringement is recent or not. Further, mitigat-
ing circumstances, where the origin of the infringement lies
partly in circumstances beyond the offending Member State's
control, will be considered.
Mitigating circumstances are, for example, where the trans-
posal of a directive is within the powers of regional authorities or
where Parliamentary enactment of the requisite national imple-
menting measures has been delayed. The ECJ has not, in the
past, accepted such pleas to excuse infringements in Article 169
proceedings. This does not mean that the ECJ will not regard
such pleas in measuring the penalty. The Court will most likely
take mitigating circumstances into account.17 Thus, while imma-
terial to the initial question of whether an infringment took
place, the sincere attempts of Member States to put an end to
infringements should be reflected in the amount of the penalty.
A penalty's deterrent effect and its relationship to measure-
ment of that penalty is as difficult to analyse as the gravity of the
infringement. The threat of a periodic penalty payment has
something of a deterrent effect, even if some writers disagree as
to its significance .3  Deterrence is really relevant only where in-
fringements are committed intentionally or negligently. If the
Parliament of a Member State refuses to pass legislation
presented by the Government, there is considerable doubt that
37. Contra Andreas Middeke & Peter Szczekalla, Anderungen im europiischen Rechts-
schutzsystem, 6JURISTENZEITUNG 284, 287 (1993).
38. Diez-Hochleitner, supra note 17, at 145.
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the threat of a fine would have any valid deterrent effect. More-
over, there is the question whether the penalty should be gradu-
ated as between richer and poorer Member States, perhaps on
the basis of an analysis of gross national product ("GNP") statis-
tics. There is no doubt that the search for fairness would make
the determination of the "appropriate" penalty even more com-
plicated. The same will be true when the Court, in determining
the amount to be paid, has to establish whether the penalty
should, in fact, be payable by the Member State itself or whether
it should be charged to some regional authority that is actually
responsible for the infringement. In most cases, the legislation
that would permit pin-pointing responsibility for payment has
still to be enacted.
In determining lump-sums and penalty payments, the Com-
mission and the Court will be acting in concert, but the Treaty
does not specify how to coordinate such dual action. The Com-
mission does enjoy the right of initiative. It is the Commission's
decision whether a lump-sum or penalty payment should be im-
posed. The Commission will be required to indicate not only
the amount it considers appropriate but also the full details of
the circumstances warranting the Courts view.
Proper criteria will have to be followed for presenting the
Commission's view. The difficulty of ranking all the considera-
tions that might come into play cannot be overestimated. Before
the ECJ, a Member State will have all the usual opportunities for
expressing an opinion on the Commission's evaluation and for
attacking this opinion. The Commission routinely refers to its
power under Article 171 (2) to recommend penalties whenever it
issues warning letters calling on Member States to present their
observations and again in its own reasoned opinions.3 9
The use of the mandatory future tense of the verb, "shall
specify," suggests that the Commission must always call for a
lump-sum or penalty payment to be ordered.4" On the other
hand, the Commission does have some discretion as to whether
it will pursue an action in the first place. It makes little sense to
39. In July 1994 the Commission announced its initiative to the Member States in
general terms, specifying the judgments with which Member States had not complied.
Commission of the European Communities, European Social Policy: A Way Forward
for the Union, a White Paper, COM (94) 333 Final (July 1994).
40. EC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 171(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 687. "The Commis-
sion . . . shall specify the amount. . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
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regard the specification of a penalty as compulsory when the
proceeding as a whole is basically optional. There may be cases
where an action under Article 171(2) is enough in itself to sub-
ject the Member State to the requisite discipline without the im-
position of a financial penalty. It can be concluded, therefore,
that it is in the Commission's discretion whether to apply for
penalties, acting selectively and using the power only in cases
that seem suitable. Much will, therefore, depend on the Com-
mission's ability to choose cases properly. The risk of discrimina-
tion does, indeed, exist. The Commission must be required to
give reasons for asking for financial penalties in some cases and
not in others.
Regarding the ECJ, there is the concomitant question
whether it can order penalties in the absence of a Commission
request for them. The relationship between the second and
third subparagraphs of Article 171(2) is so close that the nega-
tive answer seems obvious. Absent a Commission request, the
ECJ can hardly be held to have power to order financial penal-
ties. The next question is whether the Court can depart from
the Commission's request and order a penalty payment where
the Commission has requested a lump-sum, or vice versa. This
must also be answered in the negative, if only on grounds of the
ne ultra petita4 I rule.42
Enforcing penalties once they have been ordered may prove
problematic if a Member State neglects to make the payment
within the set time limit. Argument that this will never occur
due to the political implications" is little more than wishful
thinking. Enforcement against recalcitrant Member States is ex-
cluded by the fact that Articles 187 and 192 have not been
amended by the TEU. 44 It will be difficult to argue that these
Articles can be interpreted, in the light of the additions made to
Article 171, as to make the second and subsequent paragraphs of
Article 192 directly applicable to judgments of the ECJ.
Assuming for the moment that there is no prospect for such
41. Literally translated: "No outside right to bring action."
42. Contra Ulrich Everling, Umsetzung von Umweltrichtlinien durch normkonkretisier-
ende Verwaltungsanweisungen, 38 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 379, 381
(1992).
43. Tesauro, supra note 16.
44. See TEU, supra note 2, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719 (lacking
amendments to Articles 187 and 192).
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an interpretation,45 the only possibility will be to amend the
Community Financial Regulations in such a way as to permit off-
setting deductions against a Member State's future claims on the
Commission. The requisite action for this is already under way.
Precedents have been set in the agriculture and structural funds
contexts. 46 Where a Member State acts contrary to the Treaties
in a fashion that has a financial impact, the Commission can re-
taliate financially.47 In the course of the procedure for the clear-
ance of accounts for the Agricultural Fund Guarantee Section
expenditure, no reimbursements have been made since 1970 for
expenditure undertaken contrary to Community legislation.48
For Structural Funds purposes, such as the Social and Regional
Funds and the Guidance Section of the Agricultural Fund, the
Commission can reduce or halt its financial support to a Mem-
ber State that is found to have committed or permitted finan~cial
irregularities to the detriment of the relevant Fund.49 Since
these precedents are now many years old, it will be difficult to
argue that the Commission has no authority to exercise its rights
under Article 171(2) by offsetting amounts due to it against
amounts due to the Member States. Notably, lump-sums penal-
ties will be more effective in this context than monthly penalty
payments.
CONCLUSION
The new provisions of Article 171(2), Written into the EC
Treaty in the TEU, should help improve the quality of EC legisla-
tion. This provision should, therefore, be welcomed, but not
without reservations. There are a number of grounds for misgiv-
ings. It is quite obvious that such a provision was needed, since
some Member States were not meeting their Treaty obligations
in full. It was unacceptable that judgments given by the ECJ
45. Contra Middeke & Szcsekalla, supra note 37, at 288.
46. Cf Reinhard Priebe, Sanktionen und sanktionsgleiche Massnahmen im Rahmen des
-emeinschaftsfonds - neue Entwicklungen in der Gemeinschaftsgesetzgebung, in SANKTIONEN ALS
MrI-EL ZUR DURCHSETZUNG DES GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHTS, Annual Congress of the Euro-
pean Law Academy, Trier, Germany 1994 (forthcoming).
47. Id.
48. Commission Regulation No. 729/70, O.J. L 94, at 13 (1970), amended by Regu-
lation No 2048/88, O.J. L 185/1 (1988).
49. Commission Regulation No. 4253/88, implementing Council Regulation No.
2052/88, O.J. L 374/1 (1988), amended y Council Regulation No. 2082/93, art. 24, O.J.
L 193/20, at 28 (1993).
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should be ignored for so long, a fortiori where a second judg-
ment found that no effect had been given to the first. This alone
illustrates the need for the new rule. There is room, however,
for legitimate doubt as to whether financial penalties are a truly
effective way of inducing Member States to comply with their
Treaty obligations. There is a risk that penalties will reinforce
Euro-scepticism in government circles in some Member States.
Financial penalties against Member States have been successfull
as an integration tool where they were accepted voluntarily and
correspond to a clear federalist approach. In view of the
problems of interpretation and the other doubts the new provi-
sions give rise to, great caution will clearly have to be exercised
in their initial application by the Commission. The Commission
can and must be selective in its approach and begin with cases
where there is no room for dispute. Penalties must be used in
exemplary cases where failure to meet a Treaty obligation, cou-
pled with failure to comply with a firstjudgment, has had a man-
ifestly deleterious effect on the integration process. The first few
cases brought by the Commission in the ECJ must be truly con-
vincing. The Commission must not be afraid of giving full pub-
licity to its actions and the reasons behind them. An "educated"
public will be more likely to accept penalties. These penalties
must not be imposed purely as a matter of routine. Initially, sym-
bolic amounts should suffice.
